Hedonic Valuation of Sportfishing Harvest by Carter, David W. & Liese, Christopher
391
Marine Resource Economics, Volume 25, pp. 391-407  0738-1360/00 $3.00 + .00
Printed in the U.S.A. All rights reserved.  Copyright © 2010 MRE Foundation, Inc.
Hedonic Valuation of Sportfishing Harvest
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Abstract   A hedonic valuation strategy is introduced to estimate the marginal value 
of sportfishing harvest. The strategy uses market prices, thereby avoiding some of the 
measurement problems associated with the constructed or proxy prices used in com-
mon valuation methods. A charter fee hedonic equation is estimated using data from 
the market for offshore charter fishing in the Gulf of Mexico. The marginal value of 
sportfishing harvest is identified using spatial variation in harvest rates and fish sizes. 
A two-stage minimum distance estimator is used to address potential omitted variables 
and cluster-sampling issues. Our results demonstrate that valid estimates of the mar-
ginal value of sportfishing harvest can be derived directly using market prices. The 
estimated marginal value per fish is consistent with published estimates using alterna-
tive methods. Thus, the hedonic approach suggested in this article offers promise as an 
independent validation of the typical methods used to value sportfishing harvest. 
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Introduction
There is a considerable amount of research on the value of sportfishing harvest (Johnston et 
al. 2006). The dominant methodologies estimate anglers’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) either 
by direct elicitation with contingent valuation or by linking the opportunity cost of access 
to different harvest characteristics using travel cost models. In either case, the valuation 
measure is not derived from actual market prices. Rather, stated preference methods use 
a hypothetical, constructed-market price, while travel cost models use an estimated proxy 
price that is assumed to vary directly with WTP. For example, sportfishing applications of 
the travel cost model infer harvest values based on distance and travel time to fishing sites, 
with an assumed cost per mile and estimates of the opportunity cost of time as proxies for 
the price of fishing trips. Hence, estimated values are only as accurate as these calculated 
proxy prices. The problems in measuring accurate “travel prices” are well-known (Englin 
and Shonkwiler 1995; Landry and McConnell 2007; Lew and Larson 2005; Randall 1994). 
Randall (1994) goes as far as concluding that “travel cost methods cannot stand alone” and 
that validation is required using fundamentally different valuation methods. Similarly, the 
hypothetical nature of stated preference methods has been questioned, especially for the 
lack of a true budget constraint (Harrison 2006; Murphy et al. 2005).
  This article reports on a third strategy to estimate the value of sportfishing harvest 
with data on markets for fishing services offered by charter operations. The approach 
uses actual market prices—charter fees—thereby avoiding many of the aforementioned 
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measurement problems and assumptions. As such, this article uses different data types 
and a different method to corroborate the values for sportfishing harvest estimated with 
the dominant methodologies. High levels of confidence in valuation results are especially 
important if cardinal welfare measures are needed, such as when deciding resource al-
location between the recreational and commercial sectors. Further, from a data collection 
perspective, the hedonic model is operational with market data and does not require spe-
cial surveys to collect information on an angler’s location choices or stated preferences. 
A similar strategy was applied by Hunt et al. (2005a, b) to value landscape features of 
remote fishing camps, including the availability of a particular target species, but not the 
WTP for the quality or quantity of sportfishing harvest.
  The underlying rationale for the hedonic strategy in the context of recreation demand 
was recently summarized by Landry and McConnell (2007, p. 1):
When services and activities are commercially available onsite, market 
prices will reflect relative scarcity of environmental amenities, costs 
associated with production of services and activities, as well as con-
sumers’ willingness to pay for such services. 
Our adaptation of the hedonic method considers how the “onsite” market prices of charter 
fishing trips reflect the relative scarcity of harvest attributes and how this relates to an-
glers’ WTP for these attributes.1
  The hedonic strategy for the valuation of sportfishing harvest with market data about 
charter fishing trips operates under four primary assumptions. First, we assume that cli-
ents for charter services can move freely around ports in the charter market, but that the 
suppliers of charter services cannot because entry into and movement among ports by 
charter boats is restricted by institutional factors in the short to medium term. We have 
more to say on this in the discussion related to our Gulf of Mexico case study. Second, 
we assume that harvest expectations can be linked to a port. Again, because this argu-
ment must be made with reference to a particular fishery, we defer further discussion of 
this point until later. These first two assumptions set up the potential for trips operating 
from ports with higher expected harvest quality to command higher charter fees. In other 
words, because ecosystem services, such as harvest characteristics, are not spatially fun-
gible, the benefits of these services are spatially explicit (Boyd and Banzhaf 2007).
  The third assumption for the hedonic strategy defines expected harvest quality at each 
port in terms of historical averages of harvest characteristics (e.g., harvest per angler or 
weight per fish) over all charters operating out of the same port. This idea of expected qual-
ity shared by charters operating from the same ports embodies the Tirole (1996) notion of 
collective reputation as mean group quality. As Landon and Smith (1998, p. 369) explain: 
In a market with a large number of firms,..., it may be very costly for 
consumers to acquire information on the past quality of goods produced 
by all firms. It is typically less costly for consumers to acquire informa-
tion on collective (or group) quality that can be used as an indicator of 
the quality of goods produced by individual firms in the group. 
1 Our approach can be thought of as a special case of the hedonic onsite model proposed by Landry and Mc-
Connell (2007). However, by focusing on the price of only one product, for-hire sportfishing trips, we avoid the 
endogeneity issues associated with the combination of time and goods that complicate the onsite cost model. 
The proposed approach is also distinct from the hedonic travel cost model (Brown and Mendelsohn 1984), 
which has been criticized for attempting to estimate a hedonic surface using non-market “prices” (Bockstael and 
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For example, information about the expected harvest per trip from different ports is 
generally available in guide books, fishing reports, magazines, and, of course, via the In-
ternet. This leads to the fourth assumption of the hedonic strategy, which requires that the 
set of expected harvest characteristics at each port is correctly perceived by anglers and 
charter operators and thus reflected in the equilibrium charter trip price.
  Due to data limitations, ports are aggregated to county-level in our Gulf of Mex-
ico application, and all trips occurring within a county are assigned the same harvest 
attributes.2 Consequently, charter fees are measured at the trip level, whereas the har-
vest expectations—average keep rates and weight per fish over the past five years—are 
measured at the county level. This creates two potential measurement problems that we 
address in the specification and estimation of the hedonic model. First, there is potential 
for correlation among trips within the same county that could lead to biased standard 
errors (Moulton 1990). Second, the estimates of marginal WTP for expected harvest char-
acteristics can be biased if there are omitted county-level factors that affect charter trip 
prices and county-level harvest expectations. Both of these concerns are addressed using 
a minimum distance estimator introduced by Wooldridge (2003) for cluster-samples. 
  We begin with an introduction of the hedonic theory of product differentiation as ap-
plied to the charter trip market. Next, the hedonic model is specified and the estimation 
method is described. This is followed by a description of the the data and a presentation 
of the results for the Gulf of Mexico application. The article concludes with a summary 
of the findings and some additonal observations regarding the application of the hedonic 
model in the charter trip market.
Hedonic Model
The purpose of this section is to adapt the hedonic theory of product differentiation and 
welfare measurement to markets for charter fishing services. We focus on the portions of 
the theory that enable us to measure the welfare effects of marginal changes in charter trip 
harvest attributes. The valuation of large changes in harvest characteristics is not attempt-
ed because the data necessary to identify the marginal bid (i.e., inverse demand) function 
is not available for our application.
  Charter boats offer sportfishing trips that can differ in a variety of characteristics: du-
ration, passenger capacity, species targeted, expected harvest, etc. In most cases, a charter 
trip can be completely described by these characteristics, and anglers purchase the charter 
trip that satisfies their demand for trip characteristics. An angler will be willing to pay 
relatively more for a trip that offers a characteristic that is valued highly. To the extent 
possible, charter boat operators will respond by offering more trips with relatively valu-
able attributes. Therefore, following the Rosen (1974) model of product differentiation, 
the mix of charter trips offered and their prices reflect the interaction of buyers and sellers 
with respect to characteristics in a competitive market.
  In equilibrium, anglers have made their utility-maximizing choices of charter trips, 
and the resulting charter prices just clear the market given the existing trip offerings and 
characteristics and the prices of alternative trip configurations. Any differences in equi-
librium trip prices can be explained in terms of differences in trip characteristics. The 
relationship between prices and characteristics defines a hedonic price function: 
 p = g(z;γ),                                                        (1)
2 This approach parallels the methods commonly used in applied sportfishing demand models (Bockstael, Mc-
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where z is a vector of trip characteristics and γ is a vector of parameters describing the 
shape of the hedonic function. The derivative of the hedonic function with respect to an 
attribute gives the implicit price of that attribute.
  The problem for the charter boat firms is to maximize profit, π = Mg(z;γ) – c(M,z;φ),   
where c(M,z;φ) describes the cost of producing M trips with characteristics z, and φ is a 
vector characterizing individual producers. Note that there is a set of trip attributes that 
are provided costlessly to the charter firm once it has set up its operation. These are either 
trip attributes (passenger capacity, vessel speed) related to structural characteristics of the 
vessel (length, engine) that are fixed after the initial boat purchase, or spatial attributes 
associated with the home port. In our case, the expected harvest characteristics that are 
available within a day trip of the home port are the spatial attributes of interest.
  Spatially defined expected harvest characteristics are exogenous to the production 
process of any individual charter operation and serve as indicators for anglers of the 
quality of the fishing experience at each port. Specifically, the expected harvest rate and 
fish size from any given port will depend on the distribution of biomass, the incidence of 
regulations, and charter captains’ skill. As noted in the Introduction, the spatially defined 
expected harvest characteristics are intended to measure the collective fishing reputation 
for charters fishing out of the same home port, and serve as an ex ante indicator of aver-
age fishing quality.
  Following Rosen (1974, p. 42), the minimum payment a charter boat firm re-
quires to maintain a given profit level, Π0, on any of the M charter trips with a given 
spatially defined expected harvest characteristic, z1, is described by the offer function, 
0 0
1 1 = ( , , ; ), o o z z                           φ    that holds profit and all other attributes constant at Π0 and 
0
1 z− , re-
spectively. Since spatially defined expected harvest characteristics are given exogenously 
once the port of operation is established, the offer price for these attributes depends only 
on the level of profit attainable. Therefore, if we also assume that that the potential supply 
of trips is fixed once the port of operation is selected, the equilibrium “price” of spatially 
defined expected harvest characteristics is determined entirely by angler demand for these 
characteristics.3
  We further assume that entry into and movement among ports by charter boats is re-
stricted by institutional factors in the short to medium term. This assumption is plausible in 
many coastal areas where marina space is limited or, as is the case in the Gulf of Mexico 
application considered below, there is a moratorium on new charter boat permits. Note that 
charter firms cannot arbitrage fee differentials between two ports by operating from a port 
with lower expected harvest rates and fishing off a nearby port with higher expected harvest 
rates. This is due to the relative importance of fuel costs in charter fishing operations (Liese 
and Carter forthcoming) and because harvest characteristics are assumed to be reputational 
attributes that can only be changed by switching home port. However, as one reviewer 
pointed out, the extent of spatial arbitrage is actually an empirical issue that can only be 
examined with reference to the geographic range that can be reasonably covered on a single 
day trip. We address this concern in the description of the data for our case study.
  The angler’s problem for any trip is to maximize the preference function, u(x,z;β), 
subject to the budget constraint, y = g(z;γ) + x, where β is a vector of parameters for the 
preference function and x is a composite commodity with a price normalized to unity. 
The first-order conditions for the solution to the angler’s problem imply that the optimal 
choice of an expected harvest attribute, say z1, occurs where the implicit price of a change 
in the expected harvest attribute equals the angler’s marginal WTP (MWTP) for that 
change on any given trip: 
3 We thank an anonymous reviewer for helping us clarify the supply-side assumptions in the model.Hedonic Valuation of Sportfishing Harvest 395
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This expression does not suggest that the derivative of the hedonic price function with 
respect to z1 is a MWTP function for changes in the expected harvest attribute (McCon-
nell and Phipps 1987). Only at the chosen level of  z1 does the derivative of the hedonic 
function equal the angler’s MWTP for the expected harvest level. At this point, it mea-
sures the additional money that the angler with a specific set of income, preferences, and 
characteristics would pay to purchase a charter trip with a (one unit) higher level of the 
expected harvest attribute. Other anglers with a different set of income, preferences, and 
characteristics would have a different equilibrium point on the hedonic schedule. In this 
case, Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007) show that the average estimated implicit price 
will approximate the mean MWTP when the attribute varies more or less continuously 
throughout the market. To demonstrate, we adapt the simple example in Bayer, Ferreira, 
and McMillan to the charter boat market.
  Take, for example, an extreme case where there is a single discrete (i.e., non-contin-
uous) charter trip attribute defined by whether or not a charter trip can offer the catch of 
a certain species. If the species could be offered from only a few ports, then the hedonic 
price would reflect the MWTP of an angler with a relatively strong taste for the species. 
In this case, the mean MWTP is less than the implicit price because the majority of an-
glers are not willing to pay the equilibrium hedonic price. If we now consider a more 
continuous attribute, such as the expected harvest attribute discussed above, then there 
are several margins. The margins correspond with the differences in each pair of ports 
ranked according to the expected harvest attribute. In this case, averaging the equilibrium 
implicit price over all trips in the sample and weighting by the number of charter trips 
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where N is the total number of trips and  j G  is the proportion of total trips taken from port 
j = 1,2,...,J. The averages,  j z  and  1, j z , in the second summation arise because anglers 
on trips from the same port will be at the same margin and have the same MWTP when 
harvest characteristics are measured at the port-level.
  Before leaving the discussion of the hedonic model, it is instructive to clarify the 
definition of the price used in the charter hedonic equation. The prices in this model are 
the equilibrium fees for different types of charter trips established via the market forces 
of supply and demand. Importantly, these are the fees that reflect the spatially defined 
expected harvest attributes so that ports with relatively greater levels of the attributes 
command higher equilibrium fees. This occurs because anglers sort themselves among 
charter trips from different ports, in part, according to their preferences and WTP for 
expected harvest attributes. The sorting defines the shape of the hedonic frontier and is Carter and Liese 396
also based on the distribution of angler characteristics, including income, distance from 
each port, etc. In this way, a measure of expected travel distance or accessibility could 
be included as an attribute in the charter fee hedonic, but the related travel costs should 
not be added to the charter fee because these costs are already reflected in the equilibrium 
fees.4 The omission of an access distance attribute would bias the implicit price (i.e., mar-
ginal value) of expected harvest attributes if this distance is correlated with the expected 
harvest attributes. This could happen if fishing pressure is relatively higher at ports that 
are easy to access. Without an access distance attribute in the charter fee hedonic, an es-
timation strategy to deal with omitted variables is needed. Such an estimation strategy is 
proposed below in the context of the Gulf of Mexico case study.
Data
The data for the estimation of the hedonic model of harvest value in the charter boat 
market comes from three sources, all of which are affiliated with the U.S. Marine Recre-
ational Information Program (MRIP).5 In all cases we started with sub-samples consisting 
of single-day charter trips fishing offshore of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and the 
west coast of Florida. The distance between ports of the for-hire fishery in this Gulf of 
Mexico region and the focus on day trips (by far the most common trip duration) gener-
ally ensures that each port has its own fishing area. However, due to data limitations, we 
have to aggregate home ports to the county-level so that there are only as many “ports” as 
there are county areas. This aggregation is common practice in the sportfishing demand 
literature (see footnote 2).
  Information about charter fees was obtained from an economic add-on to the weekly 
MRIP For-Hire telephone survey (FHS-e) conducted over a one-year period starting July 
2002. Each week a sample of charter captains was randomly selected from a master regis-
try of vessels to answer questions about their charter activities in the prior week. Captains 
were asked about the number and general characteristics of the trips they took and were 
further asked to report cost and price information for one of these trips. There was no in-
formation collected about the catch on any of these trips.6
  We began with the MRIP FHS-e sub-sample of single-day, offshore trips that either 
bottom fished or fished via trolling, casting, or while drifting. The final sample consisted 
of 584 trips by 365 vessels with complete price and trip information. Trips were not 
reported from every coastal county in the study area, and we assigned observations in 
counties with fewer than three reported trips to adjacent counties to maintain confiden-
tiality. This reduced the number of county areas from 28 to 23. The second column of 
table 1 shows the number of sample observations in each county from the MRIP FHS-e. 
4 Inclusion of travel costs in the trip price, as is done in the hedonic travel cost model (Brown and Mendelsohn 
1984), would introduce additional noise into the hedonic relationship because the equilibrium market prices 
should already reflect the angler decisions about the trade-off between travel distance and charter fee. All else 
equal, a fishing charter that is easy to access will be able to charge a higher fee, unless remoteness is a valuable 
attribute (Hunt et al. 2005b). For example, consider two charter trips that are identical in every way except in 
the distance from the angler and price. If the price of the trip farther away is low enough, then the angler will 
choose it over the closer, more expensive trip. Again, the equilibrium market prices for charter trips will reflect 
these trade-offs by all anglers and a similar set of choices by charter firms.
5 More information about the MRIP is available online at: <http://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/st1/recreational/over-
view/overview.html>. 
6 A separate MRIP dockside intercept survey collects information about harvest as part of the Marine Recreational 
Fisheries Statistics Survey (MRFSS). However, there is no clear way to link the records from the MRFSS with those 
from the For-Hire telephone survey. Both samples are unlikely to be the same. Furthermore, information on the ac-
tual ex-post harvest for each trip would not necessarily proxy ex-ante harvest expectations, and there are not enough 
MRIP intercept records during the year of the FHS-e to produce accurate, county-level average harvest rates.Hedonic Valuation of Sportfishing Harvest 397
The third through eighth columns of the table show the MRIP FHS-e county averages for 
the charter fee excluding tips, number of passengers, hours per trip, vessel length, and 
percentage of trips that bottom fished and fished in federal waters. Beyond this last trip 
characteristic, we do not have information on where charter vessels in our study go once 
they leave the dock. However, we can speculate about the potential geographic scope of 
the charter trips relative to their county of origin. Trips lasted 7.5 hours, on average, 4.5 
hours of which were spent fishing. This suggests that vessels spent an average of three 
hours steaming to and from the fishing grounds on each trip. Assuming a relatively fast 
cruising speed of 20 mph, this gives a range of 30 miles each way. The average coastline 
distance of the 23 county areas in our case study is about 55 miles, suggesting that ves-
sels are likely to fish within the boundaries of their county of origin. Furthermore, 70% of 
the trips in the sample fished in federal waters, which start 10 miles offshore of Florida 
waters and 3 miles offshore of the other coastal states. This reduces the expected lateral 
range of any given trip even further.
  The data in the final three columns of table 1 come from the MRIP angler intercept 
survey. Columns nine and ten are intended to represent the expected harvest characteris-
tics or fishing reputation for each county area. There are many ways to characterize the 
expected quality of a fishing trip using harvest data (Freeman 1995). Harvest expectations 
for each county in the study area are proxied with historical averages of keep per unit ef-
fort (KPUE) and weight per fish. The results using ten-year historic averages were nearly 
identical to the results using five-year averages. We focus on the results for the five-year 
averages to be consistent with the approach used to proxy site quality in site-choice sport-
fishing demand models (Bockstael, McConnell, and Strand 1989; Whitehead and Haab 
2000). Results with the ten-year averages are available upon request. Averages across all 
species are used because there was not enough data to generate averages for individual 
species for each county area and because there was a high degree of correlation among 
the averages for individual species. The five-year averages are calculated from the MRIP 
angler intercept survey data for each county area. To be consistent with the MRIP FHS-e, 
only single-day charter trips fishing offshore with hook and line are included in the 
sample. There were 10,586 such trips sampled in the five years (1997–2001) prior to the 
MRIP FHS-e. The KPUE across all species is calculated for each charter trip intercepted 
as the total observed harvest in numbers of fish divided by angler hours given as the prod-
uct of the hours fished on the trip and the number of fishing party members. The data for 
the 98,526 fish measured on these trips were used to calculate the average weight per fish.
  The final column of table 1 shows the weighting factor ( j G from expression (3)) to 
be used in the mean MWTP calculations. The 2003 MRIP FHS-e data does not necessar-
ily provide an accurate measure of the current distribution of trips across county areas. 
Therefore,  j G was estimated as the average annual percentage of offshore charter trips 
observed in each county area from the MRIP angler intercept survey from 2000 to 2006.
  Table 1 shows the considerable variation across counties in the mean charter fee and 
other characteristics across the counties, especially the harvest characteristics. We can 
examine the variation of each variable across counties more carefully with the intraclass 
correlation coefficient (ICC) shown in the last row in table 1. The ICC represents the 
amount of trip-level variance that can be “explained” by county membership (Moulton 
1987).7 For example, the county-level harvest variables in the ninth and tenth columns 
have an ICC of 1 because they do not vary at all within each county, and all variation is 
explained at the county level. The ICC parameter for the charter fee suggests that roughly 
30% of the variance in the dataset occurs across counties. It is this variation that we ex-
pect to explain with the county-level harvest characteristics.
7 The ICC calculations were performed based on an ANOVA model using the ICC1 function in the multilevel 
package for R (Bliese 2008; R Development Core Team 2009).Carter and Liese 398
Specification and Estimation
We assume that offshore charter trips in the Gulf of Mexico are all offered in the same 
market and attempt to identify the effects of cross-county variations in expected harvest 
characteristics on the equilibrium market price while controlling for other factors that de-
termine charter fees. In support of the assumption regarding the geographic scope of the 
market for offshore charter trips, table 2 provides historical statistics on how far anglers 
traveled to fish on charter boats in the Gulf of Mexico. Distance data is derived using an-
gler zip code data collected by the MRFSS angler intercept survey. Table 2 shows sample 
statistics for the study period and the five preceding years, by county and in total. Over-
all, charter anglers traveled around 700 miles, on average, to fish. This is clearly skewed 
by very large distances and implies the use of air travel, though we have no data on the 
Table 1
Gulf of Mexico County Averages and Intra-County Correlation Coefficients
                                           For-Hire Economic Survey                           Angler Intercept Survey
                   
       
1  123  819  5.9  7.3  38  81  77  2.0  1.5  7.4
2  14  907  5.6  9.6  38  100  86  3.8  1.5  0.3
3  48  808  5.8  8.4  42  75  79  1.4  1.5  8.5
4  3  492  5.0  8.2  27  100  100  1.2  0.9  0.0
5  6  371  2.7  7.5  25  17  17  0.4  1.5  1.3
6  18  465  4.1  6.3  32  61  83  0.7  1.5  1.5
7  37  708  7.0  7.8  36  84  78  1.7  1.6  1.3
8  12  637  4.0  8.1  32  75  75  0.9  1.5  0.6
9  6  425  3.5  6.3  29  50  33  0.9  1.3  1.2
10  4  469  3.8  7.5  24  75  75  1.0  1.2  0.4
11  11  558  5.0  7.1  30  73  82  0.7  1.4  0.8
12  68  532  3.3  6.6  32  69  24  0.5  3.2  39.6
13  104  771  6.4  7.5  44  53  66  1.3  2.0  21.4
14  3  333  3.0  6.5  21  0  0  0.2  1.4  0.6
15  38  545  4.4  6.9  33  66  45  1.0  1.9  6.7
16  24  414  3.8  5.6  27  50  38  0.7  2.0  1.4
17  6  467  4.0  8.7  27  50  67  0.9  1.1  0.3
18  7  736  5.6  9.9  34  100  100  1.7  2.7  0.7
19  6  925  4.8  10.2  38  100  67  1.3  2.4  0.4
20  9  1,372  10.3  9.5  46  100  78  2.1  1.9  1.0
21  14  1,007  4.4  10.6  35  86  14  1.3  3.0  1.5
22  17  620  4.1  8.1  27  53  18  2.2  2.0  0.9
23  6  984  10.2  8.9  44  67  67  0.9  2.4  2.2
All obs.  584  707  5.3  7.5  37  70  61  1.3  1.9 
ICC    0.32  0.34  0.20  0.30  0.11  0.24  1.00  1.00 
1 Coastal counties: LA through FL with some adjacent counties combined due to sample size.
2 Observations from the 2002/2003 MRIP For-Hire Economic Survey.
3 Average number of fish harvested per angler per hour (MRIP angler intercept 1997–2001).
4 Average weight per fish harvested in kilograms (MRIP angler intercept 1997–2001).
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mode of travel. However, at over 400 miles, the median distance traveled is still very far 
and suggests the charter trip was part of a longer multi-day visit for a (large) majority of 
customers. At the county level, in most cases, the average distance traveled to fish is also 
quite far. Even the counties where average distance traveled to fish is relatively low, there 
are still anglers coming from far away, as indicated by the maximum distance traveled. 
This evidence suggests that anglers could consider the entire Gulf of Mexico as one mar-
ket for offshore charter trips or, at the very least, that there is enough overlap such that the 
pricing in the sub-markets is integrated.
  Theory does not offer guidance for the exact specification of the hedonic price 
function for offshore charter trips. However, Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2004) 
demonstrate the implausible assumptions implicit in the structural market model that 
implies a linear hedonic equation. In the case of the charter price hedonic, we expect 
that the WTP (i.e., the implicit price) for an additional unit of an attribute will decline as 
the total level of the attribute increases. To address this potential nonlinear relationship, 
squared terms and interactions of the continuous trip-level characteristics are included in 
the specification. Preliminary work also found that a charter fee hedonic with logarithmic 
and quadratic transformations of county-level harvest characteristics fits equally well, and 
both fit better than linear specifications (Carter, Agar, and Waters 2008). Therefore, we 
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where for trip m in county j, p is the charter fee, g is the number of passengers, t is the 
duration of the trip, l is the charter vessel length, d a dummy for federal water trips, b a 
dummy for bottom fishing trips, h is the county-level average harvest per angler per hour, 
and w is the county-level average weight per fish. The γ terms are parameters to be esti-
mated, and εmj is an independently distributed error term. Note that the dependent variable 
is in logarithms because an examination of the profile of log-likelihoods for the param-
eters of the Box-Cox power transformation suggests that logarithmic transformation of 
the charter fee provides a better fit than the absolute level.8
  There are two issues associated with the estimation of the hedonic equation. First, 
the charter fee is measured at the trip level, whereas the the primary attributes of interest, 
the harvest characteristics, are measured at the county level. As shown in table 1, the ICC 
measures suggest that the observations within each county are correlated in terms of the 
charter fee and the trip-level independent variables. Of course, the county-level variables 
are perfectly correlated for observations from the same county. In this case, estimation by 
OLS could lead to standard errors that are biased downwards, especially for the county-
level harvest variables (Moulton 1990). Recent research has shown, however, that the 
8 The log-likelihoods for the lambda parameter of the Box-Cox power transformation were computed with the 
boxcox function in the MASS package for R (R Development Core Team 2009; Venables and Ripley 2002). A 
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standard corrections (e.g., cluster-robust standard errors or random-effects estimation) are 
not reliable in cases with a relatively small number of groups (Wooldridge 2003, 2006). 
Our study with 23 counties is such a case.
Table 2
One-way Distance Traveled (Miles) to Fish on a Charter Boat
 in the Gulf of Mexico by County of Intercept: 1997–2003 
County             # of Obs.                   Average            Median            Min.        Max.
  1  1,062  459  365  2  2,874
  2  25  167  79  3  567
  3  832  408  327  3  2,916
  4  9  467  196  28  1,266
  5  91  363  120  2  2,835
  6  181  949  1,216  1  3,403
  7  107  280  97  6  1,593
  8  19  355  253  14  2,312
  9  53  858  1,129  1  3,012
  10  48  226  122  4  1,255
  11  26  632  153  6  3,106
  12  5,489  1,008  1,253  0  5,156
  13  2,409  438  352  7  4,535
  14  68  563  188  4  2,590
  15  851  618  239  2  4,694
  16  167  702  747  1  2,959
  17  33  260  178  28  1,002
  18  48  204  163  19  681
  19  42  352  191  31  1,218
  20  14  282  154  17  919
  21  104  379  174  47  1,782
  22  125  307  191  24  1,625
  23  551  389  315  2  2,435
  All obs.  12,354  708  435  0  5,156
Source: Angler home zip code to intercept site from the MRFSS intercept survey.
  The second estimation issue is the potential for omitted variables that are correlated 
with the harvest variables and charter fees at the county level. For example, population or 
factors such as marina dockage fees that affect the cost of trips could also be related to the 
fishing quality in a county. Such correlated omitted factors could lead to biased estimates 
of the parameters on the harvest characteristics in the hedonic equation.
  We use a two-stage minimum distance (MD) estimator suggested by Wooldridge 
(2003, 2006) to address the two issues related to the estimation of the charter fee hedonic. 
The estimator is consistent and  M -asymptotically normal for M → ∞, where M de-
fines the maximum number of trips per county, such that Mj = ρjM for 0 < ρj ≤ 1. This is 
in contrast to the typical panel or cluster type estimators that, in this case, would require a 
large number of counties and a fixed number of trips per county (i.e.,  J -asymptotically 
normal for J → ∞). The first stage uses a least-squares dummy variable (LSDV) estima-
tor to obtain the parameters on the trip-level variables and a vector of county fixed-effect 
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fixed effects Γ0 = γ01,...,γ0J instead of γ0, and without the county-level harvest terms, 
γh ln hj + γw ln wj. The county-level harvest terms are removed because they cannot 
be separately identified from the county.
  In the second stage, the vector of estimated county fixed-effect parameters, 
0 01 0 ˆ ˆ ˆ = ( ,       ), J γ …γ   is used along with the vector’s estimated variance matrix,  ˆ V, from 
the first stage to estimate the parameters on the county-level harvest variables as: 
         1 1 1
0 ˆ ˆ ˆ = ( ) , θ X V X X V
        (5)
where X is a data matrix with a constant and the harvest characteristics, ln h and ln w. 
The variance matrix for this estimator is 
11 ˆ () XV X
−− ′ . Essentially, the second stage 
hypothesizes that the variation in the county-level fixed effects can be completely ex-
plained by variations in the harvest characteristics; i.e., γ0j = α + γh ln hj + γw ln wj. The 
validity of these hypothesized restrictions can be tested with an overidentification sta-
tistic 
1
00 00 ˆ ˆˆ () () V
− ′ Γ −Γ Γ −Γ . This statistic is distributed χ2 with J – K – 1 degrees 
of freedom, where K is the number variables in X. If the overidentifying restrictions are 
rejected, then there are still unobserved factors that influence the variation in charter fees 
across counties. Otherwise, according to Wooldridge (2003, p. 137), we can: “have some 
confidence in the specification and perform inference using the standard normal distribu-
tion for t statistics.” In general, county-level factors, including county averages of the 
trip-level variables, can be added to X in the second stage until the overidentification test 
cannot be rejected (Wooldridge 2006).
Results
The key results of the analysis are shown in table 3, where the parameters listed correspond 
with those shown in equation (4). Parameter estimates using OLS are shown in the third col-
umn, and estimates using the minimum distance (MD) method are shown in the last three 
columns. Recall that the first stage of the MD method is estimated via LSDV to obtain the 
county fixed-effect parameters.9 The OLS and LSDV estimates for the trip-level parameters 
and model fit are similar, but an F-test from Moulton (1987) for the null of no county-
level fixed effects is rejected (2.09, df1=20, df2=552, p=0.003), suggesting that the LSDV 
specification is statistically superior to OLS. Focusing on the LSDV estimates, all trip-level 
parameters, except the one for the interaction of passengers with duration, are significant at 
the 0.05 level. The significant trip-level parameters have the expected signs: the charter fee 
increases at a decreasing rate in the number of passengers and trip duration; bottom fish-
ing trips and those in federal waters are relatively more expensive, but these effects are not 
cumulative; and trips on larger vessels command a higher price. Based on these parameters 
and the means over all observations reported in table 1, another hour or another passenger 
adds $70 or $31, respectively, to the price of a charter trip, and the implicit price per foot of 
vessel length is $8.10 Similarly, the additional value of a bottom fishing trip in federal waters 
is $123 compared to a trolling, casting, or drifting trip in state waters.
9 The 23 county fixed-effects parameters are not reported in the LSDV column of table 3. These parameters are 
available upon request.
10 These simple implicit price estimates are given by the derivative of the right-hand-side of equation (4) with 
respect to the variable of interest times the mean charter fee over all observations from table 1. For example, 
the implicit price of another passenger at the sample averages is $707*(0.050 – 0.002*2*5.3 passengers/trip + 
0.002*7.5 hours/trip)=$30.97.Carter and Liese 402
  There are two versions of the second stage of the MD estimator. Both versions use 
the 23 county fixed-effects parameters from the LSDV estimator as the dependent vari-
able. The first minimum distance estimator, MD1, only includes the county-level harvest 
variables in the second stage, whereas the second minimum distance estimator, MD2, 
 Table 3
Estimation Results
                                                                                                          Minimum Distance Estimator
           Variable          Parameter             OLS               LSDV               MD1       MD2
 
Constant  γ0  4.649***    4.649***   4.350***
    (0.094)    (0.133)  (0.601)
# of Passengers  γg  0.044**  0.050**
    (0.015)  (0.015)   
Duration of Trip  γt  0.139***   0.164*** 
    (0.022)  (0.022)   
# of Passengers Squared  γgg  –0.002*  –0.002* 
    (0.001)  (0.001)
  
Duration of Trip Squared   γtt  –0.004*  –0.005*** 
    (0.001)  (0.002)   
Passengers*Duration  γgt  0.002  0.002   
    (0.002)  (0.002)   
Bottom Fishing  γb  0.126**  0.143*** 
    (0.041)  (0.041)   
Federal Water Fishing  γd  0.144***   0.138***
    (0.035)  (0.037)   
Federal Water*Bottom  ydb  –0.080  –0.107*
    (0.050)  (0.051)   
Vessel Length  γl  0.012***  0.011***
    (0.001)  (0.001)   
Log(KPUE)  γh  0.128***    0.128***  0.090*
    (0.023)    (0.032)  (0.035)
Log(Weight per Fish)  γw  0.191***    0.191**  0.074
    (0.044)    (0.062)  (0.083)
N    584  584  23  23
R2    0.786  0.801  0.487  0.875
Adjusted R2    0.782  0.790  0.406  0.724
Standard errors of the parameter estimates are shown in parentheses.
Significance levels: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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adds county means of the trip-level variables as controls.11 Thus, the combined LSDV-
MD1 results are most comparable with the OLS results. The parameter estimates on the 
county-level harvest variables are the same in the OLS and MD1 specifications. The esti-
mates of the standard errors are also similar, but the t-tests of parameter significance are 
based on 23-3 df in the MD1 estimator and 584-12 df in the OLS estimator. Therefore, a 
finding of parameter significance is relatively more difficult in the MD1 estimator.
  Based on the χ2  overidentification statistics for the MD1 and MD2 models, the ad-
ditional county-level control variables in MD2 are necessary to identify the parameters 
on the harvest variables. The null of overidentification is rejected in MD1 (41.877, df=19, 
p=0.002), but cannot be rejected in MD2 (10.231, df=10, p=0.420). Estimates of the co-
efficient of determination are consistent with this result, suggesting that the MD2 model 
with the county means of the trip-level variables fits the county fixed effects better than 
the MD1 specification without these additional controls. These results suggest that the 
MD2 specification controls for the unobservable county-level factors that could bias the 
parameters on the harvest variables. The parameters on the harvest rate and fish weight 
are smaller and the standard errors larger in the specification in the MD2 column relative 
to the specification in the MD1 and OLS columns. In the MD2 specification, the param-
eter on fish weight is no longer significantly different from zero, but the parameter on the 
harvest rate (KPUE) is significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level.
  For reference, the parameter estimates on the county-level means of the trip-level 
variables that were used as controls in the MD2 model are shown in a table in the Ap-
pendix. Given the nonlinearity of the hedonic equation, we expect the parameters on the 
county-level means to be different than the corresponding parameters on the trip-level 
variables. The parameters on the county-level means are of secondary interest and serve 
mainly as proxies for unobserved variation in charter fees at the county-level that could 
be correlated with the harvest characteristics.
  The parameter γh  from the MD2 specification can be used together with the approxi-
mation in equation (3) and the information in table 1 to calculate the mean MWTP for a 
change in the expected harvest rate. The specification in equation (4) implies the follow-









MWTP                           γ
h
                                            (6)
where  j p  is the mean charter fee in county j, and  j G  is the MWTP weighting factor. Us-
ing the formula, the weighted average MWTP for an extra fish per angler for each hour 
fished is $67.57 with a 95% confidence interval of $9.85 to $125.29.12 Dividing this esti-
mate by the weighted county-average duration of a trip of 7.22 hours gives an estimate of 
the MWTP for an extra fish per angler per trip of $9.36 (±7.99) that is most comparable 
with estimates in the literature. Similar calculations performed using the MD1 estimate 
give a similar mean MWTP of $13.25 (±6.98) per angler for each additional fish. Both of 
these estimates are slightly lower than the mean (outlier-free) estimate of $14.33 (2003 
dollars) reported in the meta-analysis by Johnston et al. (2006) based on 48 different 
studies of U.S. recreational fisheries. Given that the species regularly caught in the Gulf 
11 All of the county-level factors from other data sources (population, median property values, etc.) that we tried 
were not statistically significant in the hedonic regression.
12 These numbers and those that follow differ from calculations using only the information in tables 1 and 3 due 
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of Mexico are at the low end of the value spectrum considered by Johnston et al., the 
results from the hedonic approach are very consistent with the published estimates using 
other methods.
  We can also consider the MWTP for a change in the expected weight per fish, even 
though the MD2 parameter (γw) on this variable was not statistically different from zero 
at any reasonable confidence level. In this case, the specification in equation (4) implies a 









MWTP                         γ
w
G                    (7)
The weighted average MWTP for an extra pound on each fish using this formula and the 
the kilograms to pounds conversion factor of 2.205 is $10.48. Dividing this estimate by 
the weighted county-average number of fish per angler per trip of 7.42 gives an estimate 
of an angler’s MWTP for an additional pound on one fish of $1.41. Again, this estimate 
is unreliable with a 95% confidence interval ranging from $–2.09 to $4.91. The same 
MWTP calculation using the MD1 results generates an average value of $3.64 and sug-
gests a 95% confidence interval ranging from $1.16 to $6.12. Nonetheless, these results 
are comparable with the only other estimate of angler MWTP for an extra pound of fish 
that we were able to find. Cameron and James (1987) used 1984 contingent value survey 
results to estimate that British Columbia anglers were willing to pay $1.16 and $7.65 (in 
2003 dollars) to increase the weight by one pound of the largest chinook and coho salmon 
caught, respectively.13
Summary and Conclusions
This article introduces a novel approach to valuing recreational fishing harvest using data 
from markets for sportfishing services. The approach uses the hedonic theory of product 
differentiation to model the variation in charter trip fees associated with variations in trip 
and harvest attributes across locations. This hedonic approach to estimating the marginal 
value of sportfish harvest is intended as an independent verification of accepted methods, 
such as the travel cost model and contingent valuation. Given the sensitivity of estimates 
to the assumptions of accepted methods, another methodology can be used as a further 
check on convergent validity.
  The hedonic approach was applied to estimate the relationship between charter fees 
and the expected number of fish kept and the expected weight per fish in the market for 
offshore charter fishing in the Gulf of Mexico. The hedonic function was estimated using 
OLS and minimum distance estimators. The minimum distance estimators were used to 
deal with clustering and omitted variables. The average MWTP per fish was calculated 
based on the estimated charter fee hedonic equation. The estimates are within the range of 
values reported in other research.
  In using actual market prices, the hedonic approach can provide cardinal measures 
of MWTP that are free of the measurement problems that trouble methods, such as 
travel cost models or contingent valuation, that use proxy or hypothetical prices. Cardi-
nal measures of MWTP may be important, for example, when evaluating the efficiency 
of resource allocations among competing uses. It is important to note, however, the key 
13 The 2003 dollar valued estimates of the 1984 values were calculated as (185.5/105.50)*$0.6574 and 
(185.5/105.50)*$4.349, where the 2003/1984 CPI (CUSR0000SA0) ratio is shown in the parentheses.Hedonic Valuation of Sportfishing Harvest 405
assumptions that underlie the valuation estimates derived from the hedonic model. Spe-
cifically, we are assuming that the market for charter services is in a perfectly competitive 
equilibrium and that variations in (county-level) expected harvest characteristics are 
reflected in the distribution of charter fees. For this to happen, the spatial distribution of 
the harvest characteristics needs to be understood by both firms and anglers, and charter 
vessels cannot completely arbitrage away price differences across counties. The latter 
is possible if harvest characteristics are viewed as reputational attributes that can only 
be changed by switching home ports (counties), which may be infeasible in the short to 
medium term. Assumptions were also made in the empirical application of the hedonic 
model. However, most of these assumptions, such those relating to the functional form 
and error distributions, are typical in applied valuation research.
  In closing note that, as with all hedonic valuation methods, information about prefer-
ences beyond MWTP is not forthcoming without further assumptions or data (Palmquist 
2005). Such information is necessary to evaluate the welfare effects of large changes in 
harvest characteristics. The application of methods designed to identify or bound the value 
of large changes to the hedonic charter model will have to wait until we are able to obtain 
additional samples of charter fees and harvest attributes from other time periods or other 
charter fishing markets. Collecting information on charter fees by adding a few questions to 
existing data collections, such as the For-Hire Survey of the MRIP, would be a good start.
References
Bayer, P., F. Ferreira, and R. McMillan. 2007. A Unified Framework for Measur-
ing Preferences for Schools and Neighborhoods. Journal of Political Economy 
115(4):588–638.
Bliese, P. 2008. Multilevel: Multilevel Functions. Silver Spring, MD: Walter Reed Army 
Institute of Research.
Bockstael, N.E., and K.E. McConnell. 1999. The Behavioral Basis of Non-Market Valu-
ation. Valuing Recreation and the Environment: Revealed Preference Methods in 
Theory and Practice, J.A. Herriges and C.L. Kling, eds., pp. 1–32. Northampton: 
Edward Elgar.
Bockstael, N.E., K.E. McConnell, and I.E. Strand. 1989. A Random Utility Model for 
Sportfishing: Some Preliminary Results for Florida. Marine Resource Economics 
6(3):245–60.
Boyd, J., and S. Banzhaf. 2007. What Are Ecosystem Services? The Need for Standard-
ized Environmental Accounting Units. Ecological Economics 63(2–3):616–26.
Brown, G.M., and R. Mendelsohn. 1984. The Hedonic Travel Cost Method. Review of 
Economics and Statistics 66(3):427–33.
Cameron, T.A., and M.D. James. 1987. Efficient Estimation Methods for “Closed-Ended” 
Contingent Valuation Surveys. The Review of Economics and Statistics 69(2):269–76.
Carter, D.W., J.J. Agar, and J.R. Waters. 2008. Economic Framework for Fishery Alloca-
tion Decisions with an Application to Gulf of Mexico Red Grouper. NOAA Technical 
Memorandum NMFS-SEFSC-576.
Ekeland, I., J.J. Heckman, and L. Nesheim. 2004. Identification and Estimation of Hedo-
nic Models. Journal of Political Economy 112(s1):S60–S109.
Englin, J., and J.S. Shonkwiler. 1995. Modeling Recreation Demand in the Presence of 
Unobservable Travel Costs: Toward a Travel Price Model. Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management 29(3):368–77.
Freeman, A.M. 1995. The Benefits of Water Quality Improvement for Marine Recreation: 
A Review of the Empirical Evidence. Marine Resource Economics 10(4):385–406.
Harrison, G.W. 2006. Experimental Evidence on Alternative Environmental Valuation 
Methods. Environmental and Resource Economics 34(1):125–62.Carter and Liese 406
Hunt, L.M., P. Boxall, J. Englin, and W. Haider. 2005a. Forest Harvesting, Resource-
Based Tourism, and Remoteness: An Analysis of Northern Ontario’s Sport Fishing 
Tourism. Canadian Journal of Forest Research 35(2):401–09.
_____. 2005b. Remote Tourism and Forest Management: A Spatial Hedonic Analysis. 
Ecological Economics 53(1):101–13.
Johnston, R.J., M.H. Ranson, E.Y. Besedin, and E.C. Helm. 2006. What Determines Will-
ingness to Pay Per Fish? A Meta-Analysis of Recreational Fishing Values. Marine 
Resource Economics 21(1):1–32.
Landon, S., and C.E. Smith. 1998. Quality Expectations, Reputation, and Price. Southern 
Economic Journal 64(3):628–47.
Landry, C.E., and K.E. McConnell. 2007. Hedonic Onsight Cost Model of Recreation 
Demand. Land Economics 83(2):253–67.
Lew, D.K., and D.M. Larson. 2005. Accounting for Stochastic Shadow Values of Time in 
Discrete-Choice Recreation Demand Models. Journal of Environmental Economics 
and Management 50(2):341–61.
Liese, C., and D.W. Carter. forthcoming. Collecting Economic Data from the For-hire 
Fishing Sector: Lessons from a Cost and Earnings Survey of the Southeast U.S. 
Charter Boat Industry. The Angler in the Environment (Proceedings from the 5th 
World Recreational Fishing Conference), S. Sutton, ed. Bethesda, MD: American 
Fisheries Society.
McConnell, K.E., and T.T. Phipps. 1987. Identification of Preference Parameters in 
Hedonic Models: Consumer Demands with Nonlinear Budgets. Journal of Urban 
Economics 22(1):35–52.
Moulton, B.R. 1987. Diagnostics for Group Effects in Regression Analysis. Journal of 
Business and Economic Statistics 5(2):275–82.
_____. 1990. An Illustration of a Pitfall in Estimating the Effects of Aggregate Variables 
on Micro Unit. Review of Economics and Statistics 72(2):334–38.
Murphy, J.J., P.G. Allen, T.H. Stevens, and D. Weatherhead. 2005. A Meta-Analysis of 
Hypothetical Bias in Stated Preference Valuation. Envronmental and Resource Eco-
nomics 30(3):313–25.
Palmquist, R.B. 2005. Property Value Models. Handbook of Environmental Econom-
ics, vol. 2, M. Karl-Goran and R.V. Jeffrey, eds., pp. 763–819. New York: Elsevier 
North-Holland.
R Development Core Team. 2009. R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Com-
puting. Vienna: R Foundation for Statistical Computing.
Randall, A. 1994. A Difficulty with the Travel Cost Method. Land Economics 70(1):88–96.
Rosen, S. 1974. Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure 
Competition. Journal of Political Economy 82(1):34–55.
Tirole, J. 1996. A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence 
of Corruption and to Firm Quality). Review of Economic Studies 63(1):1–22.
Venables, W.N., and B.D. Ripley. 2002. Modern Applied Statistics with S, 4th ed. New 
York: Springer.
Whitehead, J.C., and T.C. Haab. 2000. Southeast Marine Recreational Fishery Statisti-
cal Survey: Distance and Catch Based Choice Sets. Marine Resource Economics 
14(2):283–98.
Wooldridge, J.M. 2003. Cluster-Sample Methods in Applied Econometrics. American 
Economic Review 93(2):133–38.
_____. 2006. Cluster-Sample Methods in Applied Econometrics: An Extended Analysis. 
Unpublished, Department of Economics, Michigan State University.Hedonic Valuation of Sportfishing Harvest 407
Appendix
Estimation Results for the MD2 Control Variables
(County-Level Averages–CLA)
               Variable                        Parameter               StdErr        tValue             pValue
CLA – # of Passengers  0.261  0.148  1.766  0.105
CLA – Duration of Trip  –0.135  0.107  –1.265  0.232
CLA – # of Passengers Squared  0.015  0.006  2.552  0.027
CLA – Duration of Trip Squared  0.023  0.008  2.810  0.017
CLA – Passengers*Duration  –0.055  0.024  –2.296  0.042
CLA – Bottom Fishing  –0.702  0.248  –2.832  0.016
CLA – Federal Water Fishing  0.199  0.126  1.576  0.143
CLA – Bottom*Federal Water  0.685  0.290  2.360  0.038
CLA – Vessel Length  0.006  0.005  1.311  0.216